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INTRODUCTION
For many years, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"
or "the Agency") has been evaluating proposals to reform the rules for
hazardous waste recycling under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA").I Public surveys show that Americans continue to be
* Markus G. Puder, Ph.D., is an attorney and researcher with the Environmental Assessment Division of Argonne National Laboratory, Washington D.C. Office. In addition, he
serves as an adjunct professor of law at the Georgetown University Law Center. He is a
member of the New York State Bar and United States Supreme Court Bar. The author would
like to thank Deborah Elcock and Nancy Rauek of Argonne National Laboratory. The views
offered in this article are strictly those of the author.
I The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1994). The
RCRA was enacted in 1976, and amended in 1978, 1980 and 1984. See The Resource and
Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 95-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976); The Quiet Communities Act
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troubled by waste issues.2 Regulating recycling has proven particularly
challenging because of its multifaceted nature. While proper recycling
directs materials that would otherwise be discarded to commercial use,
preserves landfill capacities, and produces a good from used rather than
scarce virgin materials, 3 unsafe practices and sham operations harm
4
human health and pollute the environment.
EPA has attempted to resolve the conflicting scenarios posed by
recycling through the definitions of "solid" and "hazardous" wastes
under RCRA. The existing regulatory program requires that a material
must first be defined as a solid waste before it can be considered a hazardous waste. 5 A negative determination for a certain material may
mean that the transportation, handling, storage, and processing of the material are virtually unregulated, whereas a finding that the material is a
solid and hazardous waste may subject it to onerous hazardous waste
management requirements from inception to final disposition. 6 EPA's
recycling regulations.in 19807 embraced a broad concept of recycling but
left policing in the hands of the regulated community.8 In 1985, the
Agency adopted a complicated regulatory definition of "solid waste,"
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-609, 92 Stat. 3079 (1978): The Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat. 2334 (1980); The Hazardous and Solid Waste
Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221 (1984); see also Randolph H. Hill,
The "Mind-Numbing" Provisions !" the Most Complicated Environmental Statute, 21 ENVTL.
L. REP. (ENVTL. L. INST.) 10,254 (1991) (providing an excellent overview of RCRA); Barry
Needleman, Hazardous Waste Recvling Under the Resource Conservation and Recover,%Act:
Problems and Potential Solutions, 24 ENVTL. L. 971, 974-975 (1994) (explaining that RCRA's
roots extend back to the Solid Waste Disposal Act ("SWDA") of 1965, which constituted
"essentially a nonregulatory statute," and that Congress amended the SDWA to include
RCRA, thus eliminating the loopholes for unregulated land disposal of discarded materials and
hazardous wastes).
2 See EPA, EPA530SW-90-069, THE NATION'S HAZARDOUS WASTE MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM AT A CROSSROADS: THE

RCRA

IMPLEMENTATION STUDY

5 (1990) [hereinafter 1990

RISI.
3 See Philip L. Comella, Understanding a Sham: When is Recycling, Treatment? 20
B.C. ENVTL. AF. L. REv. 415, 427 (1993) (opining that "Joince waste is generated there is no
better way to manage it than by recycling").
4 See RCRA's Rec"cling Loopholes: Legislative Proposals for Redress, 1992: Hearing
Bej ore the Subcomn. on Transp. and Hazardous Materials of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 102d Cong. 4-5 (1992) (testimony of Richard C. Fortuna, Executive Director
of the Hazardous Waste Treatment Council) [hereinafter HWTC Testimony ]; RICHARD C. FORTUNA & DAVID J. LENNETr, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION: THE NEw ERA (1987).
5 42 U.S.C. § 6913(5); Overview of Subtitle C Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 260, App. I
(1997); id. § 261.3 (1999).
6 See R. Michael Sweeney, Reengineering RCRA: The Command Control Requirements
of the Waste Disposal Paradigm of'Subtitle C and the Act's Objective of Fostering Recycling:
Rethinking the Definition of Solid Waste, Again, 6 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL. FOR. 1, 8 (1996)
7 See 45 Fed. Reg. 33,084, 33,119 (May 19,1980) (final rule).
8 See Timothy F. Malloy, Once More Unto the Breach, 7 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2 n.4
(1996) (providing a brief account of EPA's hazardous waste recycling regulations); Needleman, supra note I, at 977-80 (explaining that Congress responded to the lax recycling
scheme with the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments).
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which remains largely unchanged today. 9 The rule is predicated upon
distinctions among types of materials and recycling methods."' Over the
years, EPA's approach has spawned several court challenges to the scope
of EPA's regulatory authority over recycling activities.''
In 1992, as a result of inside and outside pressures, including selfassessment, litigation, and public comments, EPA assigned a new task
force to develop proposals for comprehensive recycling reform. 12 The
Definition of Solid Waste Task Force ("the Task Force") published a
report in 1994 that recommended a three-tiered regulatory system of exemptions, tailored standards, and full hazardous waste management requirements. 13 These proposals, however, were rejected by the regulated
community and other interested parties.' 4 EPA therefore aborted the
Task Force approach and went back to the drawing board.
In 1996, EPA presented a significantly reduced reform package that
15
embraced a simpler regulatory system for hazardous waste recycling.
The Agency advanced two options of differing scopes for conditionally
exempting recycling from RCRA.' 6 Again, EPA's proposals did not garner sufficient support and died. 17 Since it proved impossible to achieve a
comprehensive consensus with respect to the process, extent, and content
of its hazardous waste recycling reforms, the Agency opted for incremental nibblings around the edges.' 8 Comprehensive redesign of the
program vanished from EPA's agenda.
This article traces EPA's project of hazardous waste recycling program reform and explores the potential reasons for its breakdown. Part I
provides a snapshot of the current regulatory framework for hazardous
waste recycling. Part II overviews driving forces behind regulatory re9 50 Fed. Reg. 614 (Jan. 4, 1985) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.260, 261, 264, 265, and 266)
(final rule).
10 See id.
I I For discussions of the major cases that unfolded in the late 1980s and early 1990s, see,
for example, Malloy, supra note 8, at 19-29; Needleman, supra note 1,at 1001-13; Sweeney,
supra note 6, at 21-3).
12 See EPA Task Force to Develop Strategy ft" Improving Definition of Solid Waste,
DAILY ENV'T. REP. (BNA), Oct. 7, 1992, at Al.
13 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, EPA, REENGINEERING RCRA FOR RECYCLING, DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE TASK FORCE: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS iii
(1994) [hereinafter
TASK FORCE REPORTI.
14 See Roundtable Group Voices Major Concerns with Draft Plan to Redefine Solid
Waste, DAILY ENV'T. REP. (BNA), June 24, 1994, at A4 [hereinafter Roundtable Group].
15 See OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, EPA, OPTIONS FOR REDEFINING RCRA JURISDICTION,
PUBLIC MEETING (1996) [hereinafter OPTIONS PAPERI; OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE, EPA, BRIEFING DOCUMENT, DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE, PUBLIC MEETING (1996) [hereinafter BRIEFING
DOCUMENT].
16 See OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15.
17 See EPA Plans Narrow Regulatory , Fixes To Improve Hazwaste Rules, INSIDE EPA,

Jan. 9, 1998, at 3 [hereinafter EPA Plans].
18 See id.
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form processes. Part III describes the evolution of the various phases of
EPA's recycling reform attempts. Finally, Part IV presents findings and
perspectives.
I. SNAPSHOT SUMMARY: THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
FOR HAZARDOUS WASTE RECYCLING
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 to pursue four core objectives: (1)
to protect human health and the environment; (2) to regulate hazardous
waste from creation to disposal; (3) to establish guidelines for disposal of
nonhazardous waste; and (4) to promote resource conservation and resource-recovery systems.19 Subtitle C of RCRA authorizes EPA to regulate hazardous wastes as a subset of solid waste. 2 ) A waste is not
21
considered hazardous, unless it is first a solid waste.
A.

SOLID WASTE DEFINITION

The statutory definition of a solid waste is based on the element of
discard. RCRA defines solid waste as "any garbage, refuse, sludge from
a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution
control facility and other discarded material. ' 22 The physical form of the
material, "whether it is a solid, liquid, or gas," is not part of the definition. 23 Any discarded material that is not otherwise excluded by regulation is a solid waste. 24 Several types of regulatory exclusions exist under
the current system.
"Simple exclusions" are available for certain primary materials, including domestic sewage, point-source industrial wastewater discharges,
and source, which is special nuclear or by-product material under the
Atomic Energy Act. 25 "Process-specific exclusions" relate to certain activities that involve materials reinjected productively into the manufac19 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6902(a)-(b) (1994).
20 Id. § 6903(5); Overview of Subtitle C Regulations, 40 C.F.R. pt. 260, App. 1 (1997);
id. § 261.3 (1999).
21 EPA, EPA530-R-97-05 1, RCRA, SUPERFUND & EPCRA HOTLINE TRAINING MODULE,
INTRODUCTION

TO: DEFINITION

OF SOLID WASTE AND

HAZARDOUS WASTE RECYCLING

3

(1997) [hereinafter TRAINING MODULE]; Needleman, supra note I, at 972.

22 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27). This section defines "solid waste" as
any garbage, refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply treatment
plant, or air pollution control facility and other discarded material, including solid,
liquid, semisolid, or contained gaseous material resulting from industrial, commercial, mining, and agricultural operations, and from community activities, but does
not include solid or dissolved material in domestic sewage, or solid or dissolved
materials in irrigation return flows or industrial discharges. ...

Id.
23 See TRAINING MODULE, stpra note 21, at 3.

24 For a detailed description of the regulatory definition of solid waste, see Needleman,
supra note 1, at 988-1001.
25 Id. at 984.
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turing process. 26 "Facility-specific exclusions" are based on case-by27
case variances.
Discarded materials include abandoned, 28 recycled, 29 inherently
waste-like materials, 3 1 as well as certain military munition materials. 3'
The recycling prong requires that one must know both what the material
3
is and how it is being recycled before making the waste determination. 2
Subject to exceptions, EPA classifies as solid wastes specific materials
that are recycled in a particular fashion. 33 The Agency divides all used
or residual waste-like materials into five types of materials: (1) spent
materials; 34 (2) sludges; 35 (3) by-products; 36 (4) commercial chemical
26 Id. at 985-87.
27 Id. at 987.
28 Materials are abandoned if they are "disposed of; or burned or incinerated: or.accumu-

lated, stored, or treated (but not recycled) before or in lieu of being abandoned by being disposed of, burned, or incinerated." 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(i), (b)(l)-(3) (1999); see also
RIDGEWAY HALL ET AL., RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTES HANDBOOK 2.2, at 2-7 (1l h ed. 1996)

(noting (1)the centrality of the concept of "abandoned" to the regulatory definition of "solid
waste;" and (2) the absence of a definition of the terms "burned" and "incinerated").
29 A material is a solid waste if it is recycled, or accumulated, stored, or treated before
recycling, pursuant to any of four types of activities. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(ii), (c)(I)-(4). A
material is 'recycled" if it is "used, reused, or reclaimed." Id. § 261.1(c)(7). A material is
"used or reused" if it is employed either as an ingredient in an industrial process to make a
product or as an effective substitute for a commercial product. Id. § 261.1(c)(5). A material is
"reclaimed" if it is processed to recover a usable product or if it is regenerated. Id.
§ 261.1 (c)(4); see also TRAINING MODULE, Supra note 21, at 5 (explaining that (1)distillation
bottoms from one process utilized as feedstock in another process, such as spent pickle liquor
applied as a sludge conditioner in wastewater treatment, fall into the category of used or reused
materials: and (2) regeneration of spent solvents is an example of reclamation).
30 Certain materials are always considered "solid wastes" when they are recycled in any
manner. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(a)(2)(iii), (d)(l)-(3) (providing that the list of inherently waste-like
materials includes (1)certain materials assigned with listed hazardous waste codes: (2) characteristic or listed hazardous materials fed to a halogen acid furnace, subject to certain exceptions for bromited materials: and (3) wastes added by the Administrator pursuant to certain
regulatory criteria).
31 Certain unused, used, or fired munitions may constitute solid wastes. Id.
§§ 261.2(a)(iv), 266.202(b)-(c).
32 See TRAINING MODULE, sUpi'a note 21, at 5.
33 See Jeffrey Gaba, Solid Waste and Recycled Materials under RCRA: Separating Chaff
from Wheat, 16 ECOLOGY L. Q. 623, 634 (1989).
34 Spent materials are used materials that, as a result of contamination, can no longer
serve the purpose for which they were produced without processing. 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(1);
see also 50 Fed. Reg. 614, 624 (Jan. 4, 1985) (providing examples of spent solvents, spent
activated carbon, spent catalysts, and spent acids).
35 A sludge is any solid, semisolid, or liquid waste generated from a wastewater treatment plant, water supply treatment plant, or air pollution control device (e.g., baghouse dust
from a primary metal smelter). Id. §§ 261.1(c)(2), 260.10; see also id. § 261.2(c) tbl.l (showing two categories of sludges: (1)those on the F or K hazardous waste lists, and (2) those with
a hazardous characteristic).
36 A by-product as a material that is not one of the primary products of a production
process and that is not solely or separately produced by the production process. Id.
§ 261.1(c)(3); see also id. § 261.2(c) tbl.1 (containing two classes of by-products: (1)listed,
and (2) those exhibiting a hazardous characteristic); TRAINING MODULE, supra note 21, at 6
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products; 37 and (5) non-excluded scrap metal.3 Recycling these materials pursuant to one of the following four activities may then trigger the
solid waste definition: (1)use constituting disposal; 39 (2) burning for energy recovery; 40 (3) reclamation; 4' and (4) speculative accumulation.42
(explaining that "by-product" is a catch-all term for wastes that are not spent materials or
sludges); Needleman, siqora note 1, at 992 (noting that (1)by-products have to be distinguished from co-products, because most co-products are not wastes: (2) that this subtle distinction has been subject to abuse; (3) that co-products, which incidentally derive from the
production process, can be used by the general public without further processing; and (4) that
lead produced during copper smelting and kerosene or asphalt produced during petroleum
refining are examples of co-products, whereas examples of by-products include still bottoms,
reactor clean-out materials, slags, and drosses).
37 Commercial chemical products ("CCPs") include unused chemical intermediates, offspecification variants, and spill or container residues. 40 C.F.R. § 261.33; see also TRAINING
MODULE, supra note 21, at 6 (explaining that the expanded definition of CCPs, which is also
part of the hazardous waste identification process for P- or U-listed wastes, includes (1)nonlisted chemicals with a hazardous characteristic (e.g., off-specification jet fuel), and (2) unused
chemicals that exhibit a hazardous characteristic, even though they are not commonly considered chemicals (e.g., unused circuit boards, unused batteries)).
38 Scrap metal is defined as bits and pieces of metal parts or metal pieces that may be
combined with bolts or soldering, which, when worn or superfluous, can be recycled. 40
C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(6): see also 50 Fed. Reg. at624 (providing that the term includes products
of metal that become worn out such as scrap automobiles and radiators). For the definitions of
excluded scrap metal, see 40 C.F.R. § 261.1(c)(9)-(12).
39 Use constituting disposal covers direct application to or placement on the land as well
as use to produce products that are applied to or used on the land. 40 C.F.R.
§ 261.2(c)( 1)(i)(A)-(B). If, however, direct placement of a CCP on the land is "consistent with
its normal use (i.e. a pesticide)," it is not a solid waste. TRAINING MODULE, supra note 21, at 7
(explaining that heptachlor can be a P-listed waste, but it is not regulated as a solid waste when
used as a pesticide).
40 The term includes burning for energy recovery and using wastes to produce a fuel, or
being otherwise contained in fuel. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(2)(i)(A)-(B). But listed commercial
chemical products that are themselves fuels and certain used oils are not considered solid
wastes when burned. Id. § 261.2(c)(2)(ii) see also TRAINING MODULE, supra note 21, at 7:
Needleman, supra note I, at 994 (explaining that wastes may be burned in three devices:
incinerators, boilers, and industrial furnaces).
41 Spent materials, listed sludges, listed by-products, and non-excluded scrap metal are
solid wastes when reclaimed, while characteristic sludges, characteristic by-products, and
listed commercial chemical products are not. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c)(3). For a definition of
reclamation, see id. § 261.1(c)(4) (explaining that a material is reclaimed if it is processed to
recover a usable product or if it is regenerated, e.g., recovery of lead values from spent batteries and regeneration of spent solvents).
42 Spent materials, listed sludges, characteristic sludges, listed by-products, characteristic
by-products, and non-excluded scrap metal are solid wastes when speculatively accumulated,
while listed commercial chemical products are excepted. Id. § 261.2(c)(4). For a definition of
speculative accumulation, see id. § 261.1(c)(8) (explaining that speculative accumulation occurs if a person cannot demonstrate that 75% or more of the material is recycled in a calendar
year, commencing January 1). See also 50 Fed. Reg. at 634 (codified at 40 C.F.R
§ 261.2(c)(4)) (providing that a material is accumulated speculatively if it has no viable market); TRAINING MODULE, supra note 21, at 7 (providing an example of a facility deemed to
engage in accumulative speculation). The penalty under the accumulation provision assures
.that legitimate quantities of the waste are recycled and not simply stored to avoid regulation.
Id.

2000]

SOUNDS OF SILENCE

101

The Agency has summarized its solid waste recycling definition in a ta43
ble matrix.
In light of the breadth of its solid waste definition, EPA has crafted
numerous exclusions and exemptions. 44 For instance, the Agency does
45
not classify as solid wastes materials that are used as an ingredient,
used or reused as a product substitute, 46 or returned to the production
process without reclamation, 47 except in specific circumstances that require solid waste management. 48
Moreover, certain closed-loop
processes are also exempt from the solid waste definition. 49 In sum,
EPA asserts RCRA jurisdiction when a process resembles waste manage51
ment rather than an ongoing manufacturing process.

B.

HAZARDOUS WASTE RECYCLING REQUIREMENTS

After a material that is not eligible for exclusions or exemptions has
been classified as a solid waste, the next step in the process is to determine whether it is a hazardous waste. 5 1 The statutory definition of hazardous waste focuses on the high-level threats that a solid waste may
43 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(c) tbl.I.
44 Id. § 261.2(e)(I)-(2), (f). For a detailed discussion of regulatory exclusions and exemptions, see Needleman, supra note 1, at 984-88. See also Marcia E. Williams & Jonathan
Z. Cannon, Rethinking the Resource Conservation and Recover , Act ftw the 1990s, 21 ENVTL.
L. REP. (ENvTL. L. INST.), 10,063, 10,069 (1991) (observing that exclusions reduce the economic disincentives to recycling caused by RCRA).
45 A material is not a solid waste if it is directly used as an ingredient in a production
process without being reclaimed. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(1)(i).
46 A material used as an effective substitute for a commercial product without first being
reclaimed is not a solid waste. Id. § 261.2(e)(1)(ii). For examples, see TRAINING MODULE,
supra note 21, at 9.
47 A material reintroduced into the original process of production without reclamation is
not a solid waste. Id. § 261.2(e)(l)(iii); see also 59 Fed. Reg. 47982, 48041 (Sept. 19, 1994)
(providing that the exclusion covers a return to both primary and secondary production
processes); TRAINING MODULE, supra note 21, at 9 (observing with respect to "closed-loop
recycling" that (I) the material has to be used as a raw material or feedstock in the production
process, but must not be reclaimed prior to its reintroduction into the system; (2) the material
does not have to be returned to a specific unit within the production process; and (3) in secondary production scenarios, the management of the material must not involve placement on
land).
48 Certain materials are designated as solid wastes even though they are used or reused
directly without prior reclamation: (1) those used in a manner constituting disposal or used to
produce products applied to the land; (2) those burned for energy recovery, used to produce a
fuel, or contained in fuels; (3) those accumulated speculatively; and (4) those considered inherently waste-like. 40 C.F.R. § 261.2(e)(2)(i)-(iv).
49 A material returned to the original production process from which it was generated
with prior reclamation is not a solid waste if certain requirements governing the storage and
conveyance system, the reclamation process, the accumulation time of the materials, and the
usage of the reclaimed material are met. Id. § 261.4(a)(8)(i)-(iv).
10 See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at B-4.

5

See TRAINING

MODULE,

suplra note 21, at 10.
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pose to human health and the environment. 52 RCRA does not prescribe a
method for determining whether a solid waste is hazardous but delegates
this authority to EPA. 5 3 The regulatory definition of hazardous waste, 54
barring certain exclusions and exemptions, 55 covers listed 56 and characteristic 57 wastes, as well as certain waste mixtures58 and residues.5 9
EPA's "cradle to grave" regulations govern hazardous waste generators, transporters, and treatment, storage, and disposal facilities
("TSDFs").611A generator is a person who creates a hazardous waste or
causes it to become subject to hazardous waste management requirements. 6' The regulatory stringency varies according to the volume of
52 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(5) (1994). According to the statute,
The term "hazardous waste" means a solid waste, or combination of solid wastes,
which because of its quantity, concentration, or physical, chemical, or infectious
characteristics may: (A) cause, or significantly contribute to an increase in mortality
or an increase in serious irreversible, or incapacitating reversible, illness: or (B) pose
a substantial present or potential hazard to human health or the environment when
improperly treated, stored or disposed of, or otherwise managed.
Id.
53 42 U.S.C. § 692 1(a)-(b) (directing EPA to develop and promulgate criteria for hazardous waste taking into account "toxicity, persistence, and degradability in nature, potential for
accumulation in tissue, and other related factors such as flammability, corrosiveness, and other
hazardous characteristics").
54 40 C.F.R. § 261.3 (1999).
55 For statutory exclusions, see 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (b)(2)-(3). For regulatory exclusions,
see 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a)(1), (c)(2)(ii), (d), 261.4(b)(l)-(15). For regulatory exemptions from
certain hazardous waste management requirements, see id. § 261.4(c). See also TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 13, at B-6 (explaining (1) that the statutory exemptions are known as
"Bevill Wastes" and include wastes from the combustion of coal or other fossil fuels, mining
wastes, and cement kiln dust: (2) that through the hazardous waste exemption EPA retains
RCRA jurisdiction over these materials while not defining or regulating them as hazardous
wastes; and (3) that examples of EPA's exemptions include certain chromium wastes from the
leather tanning industry as well as chlorofluorocarbon refrigerants that are reclaimed).
56 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.3(a)(2)(ii), 261.11. For the various listed hazardous wastes, see id.
§§ 261.30-261.33.
57 Id. §§ 261.3(a)(2)(i), 261.10. EPA has identified four characteristics: ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity, and toxicity. Id. §§ 261.20-261.24.
58 Id. § 261.3(a)(2)(iii)-(iv): see also Comella, supra note 3, at 430 n.146 (explaining
that the combination of a listed hazardous waste with a solid waste results in a hazardous waste
irrespective of toxic-constituent concentration levels).
59 40 C.F.R. § 261.3(c)(2); see also Comella, supra note 3, at 430 n.147 (explaining that
according to the "derived-from" rule, any solid waste residue from the treatment, storage, or
disposal of a listed hazardous waste is a hazardous waste irrespective of toxic-constituent concentration levels).
60 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921-6939e (containing hazardous waste management provisions). For
the regulations that apply to each category, see 40 C.F.R. pts. 262-265. See also Needleman,
supra note 1, at 976 (explaining that RCRA's hazardous waste system has established: (1)
identification and listing methods; (2) tracking mechanisms: (3) standards for generators,
transporters, treaters, and disposers: and (4) permitting controls).
61 40 C.F.R. § 261.10; see also Markus G. Puder, Trash, Ash, and the Phoenix: A Fifth

Anniversarv Review of the Supreme Court's City of Chicago Waste-to-Energy Combustion Ash
Decision, 26 B.C. ENvrL.

AFF. L.REV.

473, 48( n.45 (1999) (asserting that (1) generator re-
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waste generated. 62 The requirements for transporters 63 and TSDFs 64 are
rigorous and comprehensive.
Hazardous wastes that classify as "recyclable materials" '65 may be
regulated at levels that range from zero to full regulation and that differ
according to the type of material and recycling activity. 66 Recycling operations that are not exempt or governed by EPA's tailored provisions for
recyclable materials 67 are subject to full-fledged RCRA hazardous waste
regulation. 68 In general, management activities before recycling, like
transportation and storage, 69 are subject to comprehensive regulation,
whereas the actual recycling process itself is exempt. 7) While the treatment and land disposal of hazardous waste are subject to permit require-

quirements include hazardous waste determination through knowledge or testing, completion
of forms to obtain an EPA identification number, a manifest, proper waste handling and preparation for transportation, onsite storage restrictions, biennial reporting, and implementation of
a waste-minimization program: and (2) compliance is in general more labor and management
intensive than it is technically difficult or prohibitively costly).
62 For a summary, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at B-6, B-7 (explaining (1)
that large quantity generators, who generate more than 1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste in
any calendar month, must comply with full generator requirements and an accumulation time
limit of 90 days; (2) that small quantity generators who produce more than 100 kilograms but
less than l,l00 kilograms of hazardous each month are in general subject to large quantity
generator provisions, except that the accumulation time limit is 180 days; and (3) pursuant to
§ 261.5, conditionally exempt small quantity generators, who generate less than 100 kilograms
of hazardous waste each month, are exempt from most RCRA Subtitle C requirements).
63 See Puder, supra note 61, at 480, n. 45 (observing that offsite transportation rules
require compliance with Department of Transportation ("DOT") provisions (including labeling, marking, placarding, proper container use, and spill reporting); completion and maintenance of manifests; delivery of hazardous wastes only to designated treatment, storage, and
disposal facilities: and cleanup responsibility for accidental spills or discharges).
64 TSDF requirements involve permitting, unit-specific standards for each type of treatment or disposal facility; emergency preparedness and contingency plans; record-keeping and
reporting: closure and post-closure requirements; Land Disposal Restrictions, which prohibit
hazardous waste disposal in or on the land unless it has been treated according to EPA standards: and corrective action when hazardous waste is improperly handled and goes beyond
facility boundaries. Id. For more detail, see Malloy, supra note 8, at 8-15 (describing management standards and permitting requirements that may be applicable to hazardous waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities).
65 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(l) (1999): see also Malloy, supra note 8, at 16 n.100 (observing
that "EPA reluctantly adopted the term . . .to avoid any stigma associated with the term
hazardous waste that might attach to the materials being recycled").
66 Id. §§ 261.6, 261.9.
67 Id. § 261.6(a)(2)-(4).
Id. § 261.6(b)-(d).
Id. § 261.6(b) (requirements for generators and transporters of recyclables); § 261.6(c)
(requirements for storage facilities).
70 See Malloy, supra note 8, at 17 (noting that "EPA's justification for excluding recycling processes from regulation was its inability to develop appropriate management standards in a timely manner").
68

69
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ments, hazardous waste recycling does not require a RCRA hazardous
7
waste permit. 1

1. Exemptions f6r Recyclables
EPA's regulations exempt certain recyclables from hazardous waste
regulation when they are recycled in a specific fashion. 72 The exempt
materials include industrial ethyl alcohol, 73 scrap metal, 74 waste-derived
fuels produced during refining processes, 7 5 and waste-derived fuels and
76
oils that are not refined.
2. Specific Recycling Standards
EPA has promulgated specific standards for a variety of recyclable
materials 7 7 : those used in a manner constituting disposal, 78 those used for
reclamation of precious materials, 7 9 spent lead-acid batteries that are re71 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(c). Some air emission regulations, however, may apply as provided
by id. § 261.6(d). See TRAINING MODULE, supra note 21, at 15-16. State hazardous waste
regulations, and other federal or state environmental laws and regulations may also apply. ld.;
see also Comella, supra note 3, at 416, 427-429 (explaining that RCRA exempts recycling
from pre-construction and operating permits, which represents substantial time and cost savings, as well as more favorable public perceptions).
72 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(3).
73 Id. § 261.6(a)(3)(i); see also TRAINING MODULE, supra note 21, at 14 (explaining that
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms already regulates industrial ethyl alcohol from
the point of regeneration to redistillation).
74 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(3)(ii).
75 Id. § 261.6(a)(3)(iii) (stating that the wastes must have resulted from normal petroleum refining, production, and transportation practices); see also TRAINING MODULE, SUpra

note 21, at 14-15 (noting (I) that wastes meet the requirement of being "refined" when they
are inserted into part of the process designed to remove contaminants, typically prior to distillation: and (2) that the exemption is not triggered if a facility takes an oil-bearing hazardous
waste and processes it without distillation to produce a fuel).
76 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(3)(iv)(A)-(C) (stating that the exemption covers: (1) fuels reintroduced into a process that does not involve distillation or does not produce products from
crude oil; (2) fuels inserted into the refining process after the distillation step: and (3) reclaimed oils burned as a fuel without reintroduction to a refining process); see also TRAINING
MODULE, supra note 21, at 15 (emphasizing the requirement that the fuels and oils must meet
the regulatory used oil specifications). For EPA's used oil specifications, see 40 C.F.R.
§ 279.11.
77 Id. § 261.6.
78 Id. §§ 266.20-266.23. This type of reuse of a recyclable material is regulated as land
treatment or landfilling due to similarities with simple land disposal. See Training Module,
supra note 21, at 12.
79 40 C.F.R. § 266.70. Recyclable materials reclaimed to recover economically significant amounts of individual or combinations of precious metals are subject to reduced management requirements, unless they are accumulated speculatively and have to comply with full
hazardous waste management requirements. Id. § 266.70. Upon a finding of unsafe storage,
however, the EPA Regional Administrator may subject storage of recyclable materials before
reclamation to full RCRA hazardous waste management regulations. Id. §§ 260.40-260.41.
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claimed,1° hazardous wastes that are burned for energy recovery,"' used
oil, s2

exported or imported hazardous wastes from designated member
countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop84
ment for the purpose of recovery,8 3 and universal wastes.
3. Recyclables Subject to Full Regulation

Recyclable materials that are not exempt or covered by reduced
standards are subject to full hazardous waste regulation.8 5 In addition,
generators and transporters of recyclable materials must comply with all
applicable hazardous waste generation and transportation requirements.8 6
Finally, owners and operators of facilities that store hazardous materials
prior to recycling must conform to all applicable treatment, storage, and
disposal facility requirements.8 7 However, if the owner or operator of a
facility does not store the recyclable material prior to reuse or recycling,
reduced requirements may apply.""
C.

OBSERVATIONS

Without having articulated a basic philosophy for regulating hazardous waste recycling, EPA has devised a highly complex regulatory program.8 9 The definitions, exclusions and exemptions, counter exceptions
and negations, and layers of management standards are scattered, overloaded, and difficult to understand. Moreover, the Agency did not consolidate its recycling provisions into one discrete common area of the
regulations. These program deficiencies may hamper proper implementation, permitting, and enforcement. 9t The high proportion of Superfund
8H Id. § 266.80. For a table compiling plain-language requirements and exemptions for
different combinations of reclamation and management activities, see id. § 266.80(a). For the
alternative option of managing spent lead-acid batteries under the universal waste regulations,
see id. pt. 273.
81 Id. §§ 266.100-266.206: see also JOHN-MARK STENSVAAG, HAZARDOUS WASTE LAW
AND PRACTICE SECTION 3, 88 (1992) (contrasting wastes destroyed by incinerators, which are
fully regulated under RCRA Subtitle C, from wastes burned in industrial furnaces for materials
recovery, which may escape such regulation). For a discussion of the regulatory scheme for
burning hazardous wastes, see Needleman, supra note 1, at 994-99.
82 40 C.F.R. § 261.6(a)(4).
83 Hazardous waste that is exported to or imported from designated member countries of
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD") for recovery is subject to regulation if it is subject to federal manifesting requirements, to universal waste management standards, or to state requirements. Id. § 261.6(a)(5).
84 Batteries, thermostats, and pesticides, and lamps destined for disposal or recycling are
subject to the reduced requirements of part 273. Id. § 261.9.
85 Id. § 261.6(b)-(d).
86 Id. § 261.6(b).
87 Id. § 261.6(c)(1).
88 Id. § 261.6(c)(2).
89 See 1990 RIS, supra note 2, at 38.
9o Id.
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sites that have been linked to unfettered recycling and unregulated disposal of recycling residues illustrates this deficiency. 9'
The evaluation of EPA's regulatory recycling program is further
complicated by the limited amount of available data. 92 The information,
which EPA collects from certain hazardous waste handlers that are re-

94
93
quired to report their activities every two years, is fairly general.

Very little of the data is organized by specific industry or practice. According to the Agency, over 20,000 large-quantity hazardous waste generators produce almost 41 million tons of hazardous waste. 95 EPA
estimates that about 300 facilities conduct "recovery operations" '96 which
affect over 3.6 million tons of hazardous wastes and represent 10% of the
total national hazardous waste management. 97 The Agency's figures
may, however, only reflect a small portion of the recycling operations
conducted nationwide. 98
The main recyclers by industry branch include organic chemicals
producers, blast furnaces and steel mills, business services, and industrial
gas industries. 99 The main recycling categories include on-site re91 See Needleman, supra note 1,at 10 14-15 (noting that (1)20% of the nation's worst
hazardous waste sites have been created through activities related to hazardous waste recycling; (2) activities include recycling solvents, metals, batteries, polychlorinated biphenyls,
used oil, fill and road materials, feedstocks, fly ash, smelting, and cement-kiln dust; and (3) the
problem is widespread across the country).
92 See Telephone Interview with Jim O'Leary, Member, Definition of Solid Waste Task
Force, Office of Solid Waste, EPA (Oct. 12, 1994) (on file with author) (explaining that (1)
neither EPA nor the states currently gather comprehensive data pertaining recycling activities;
(2) certain recyclers may qualify for exemptions from reporting requirements; (3) individual
companies and industry associations are still conducting "specification" studies to characterize
and ascertain their waste streams and volumes; and (4) recyclers may be reluctant to share cost
and other financial information).
93 40 C.F.R. §§ 262.41, 264.75, 265.75 (1999).
94 For the most current report, see EPA, EPA53(I-R-99-036c, THE NATIONAL BIENNIAL
RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT (BASED ON 1997 DATA) (1999) [hereinafter 1999 BIENNIAL REPORT1.

95 See id. at I-1.
96 In contrast to the 1999 Biennial Report, the 1993 Biennial Report contained more
extensive statistics and used the term "recycling" instead of "recovery operation." EPA, NATIONAL BIENNIAL RCRA HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORT (BASED ON 1989 DATA) (1993) [hereinafter 1993 BIENNIAL REPORTI.
97 See 1999 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 94, at 2-9 (providing the methods defined as
recovery operations and the quantity managed by each method); see also Malloy, supra note 8,
at 4-7 (describing the commercial environment for recycling metal-bearing hazardous wastes,
spent solvents, and energy recovery).
98 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at D-3 (describing a Chemical Manufacturers
Association 1988 survey of 582 plants, which found that approximately 5 million tons of
hazardous waste were recycled in the chemical industry alone); see also Telephone Interview
with Jim O'Leary, supra note 92 (explaining that, in addition to reporting exemptions for
certain generators, some recycled materials are not categorized as hazardous wastes by federal
law although they may be covered by state law).
99 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at D-7.
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cycling,""' captive recycling and product stewardship,'"' and commercial

recycling."' 2 EPA estimates that over 43% of recycling occurs onsite.11 3 Economic feasibility, the accessibility of technical expertise, the
availability of markets, and the permitting burdens are important factors
governing the decision to recycle and the selection of a particular
location. 114
EPA's hazardous waste recycling regulations have been subject to
challenges and criticisms from a wide-ranging spectrum of interested
5
parties, in particular industry, states, and environmental groups." 1
While most players agree that the regulatory system needs to be clarified,
10 6
the details of their concerns differ significantly.
Members of industry note the difficulty of interpreting and applying
the definitions consistently; the costly, time-consuming, and uncertain
permitting processes; the high production costs for recyclable materials
and their derivatives; the stigma associated with hazardous waste recyclables; the danger of inconsistent implementation by the states; and the
burdensome system for permit modifications. 1 17 According to industry
officials, these deficiencies pose significant problems for manufacturing
facilities. " "' Businesses are reluctant to invest in recycling units because
of permitting uncertainties, competitive disadvantages against manufacturers using virgin materials, and enforcement based on paperwork violations.'" 9 As a consequence, industry representatives find that consumer
100 On-site recycling is the recycling of materials generated at a manufacturing facility.
See id. at D- 1. Most industrial hazardous waste is recycled at the generating facility. See id.
tot Captive recycling involves the generation of materials at one location, while the recycling is conducted at another facility owned by the same company. See id. at D-2. In the
course of product stewardship, manufacturers take back products for the purpose of recycling.
See id.
I02 Commercial recycling occurs when a manufacturer sends materials to an unrelated
plant for recycling. See id.
I03 See id. at D-3: see also Telephone Interview with Jim O'Leary, supra note 92 (observing that (1) 63% of all first-time recycling is conducted off-site; (2) first-time recyclers are
those that have not been recycling but treating in the previous cycle; and (3) small businesses
favor off-site recycling for economic reasons).
104 Two-thirds of the respondents to a survey reported individual or several factors limiting their recycling inclination, while the remaining third did not feel constrained to launch new
recycling activities. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at D-3, D-4. For observations
on the impact of permitting: see 1993 BIENNIAL REPORT, supra note 96, at 1: DPRA INC.,
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF RCRA TREATMENT AND DISPOSAL COSTS WITH AND WITHOUT
REGULATORY MODIFICATIONS (1991); EPA, METAL RECOVERY, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION
& HAZARDOUS WASTES: AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL RCRA SUBTITLE C REGULATIONS AFFECTING METAL RECOVERY FROM HAZARDOUS WASTES (1994).
105 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3-1 to 3-3.
106 See id. at 3-1 to 3-3.
107 See id. at 3-2.
18 See id.
I()9 See id.
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costs are raised, natural resources are wasted, and job creation and technology innovation are stifled. '"
States have also raised concerns about the complexity of the regulatory definitions; the difficulty of distinguishing products, raw materials,
and legitimate recycling from wastes and sham recycling; the loophole
for characteristic wastes sent for reclamation; and the impossibility of
tracking materials and inspecting facilities in the case of exempt recyclables.''' Many states maintain that these factors interfere with their ability to implement and enforce the RCRA program by heightening
administrative costs, creating the potential of mismanagement and overregulation of legitimate recycling activities, discouraging the approval or
permitting of recyclers, preventing them from advising the regulated
community before enforcement actions, and giving rise to a universe of
potential unknown concerns.' 12
Finally, environmental groups have emphasized the high number of
recycling sites on the Superfund National Priorities List; the information
deficit associated with exempt recycling; and the lack of oversight, regu1 3
lation or product specification for exempt waste-derived products.
According to the environmental community, human health and the environment are in jeopardy because of the specters of enforcement impairment, undetected releases, and hidden risks in waste-derived products. '14
II.

OVERVIEW: THE DRIVING FORCES BEHIND
REGULATORY REFORM PROCESSES

The drivers of regulatory reform generally include a combination of
congressional oversight, agency self-assessment, litigation, and public
participation. Congress's oversight authority is generally rooted in its
constitutional powers to legislate and appropriate.' 1 5 Oversight is gaining increasing attention because of the growing numbers and complexities of federal programs and agencies.' 1 6 Congressional oversight
activities are conducted through a wide array of channels, organizations,
and structures, including formal committee hearings, informal member
contacts with executive officials, staff studies to support agency reviews,
casework undertaken by member offices, and analyses prepared by noncongressional entities.' '7
I In See id.
'' I
112
113
114

See
See
See
See

id. at 3-2 to 3-3.
id. at 3-3.
id.
id.

115 For an in-depth study of the power, see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MANUAL

116 See

id.

117 See id.

(1999).
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EPA's rigorous self-evaluation, which launched the Agency's review of the nation's hazardous waste management program under
RCRA, was sparked by a commitment made by a high-ranking EPA official during a congressional confirmation hearing.' I ' Congress, however,
never arrogated the process by changing the applicable law and requiring
EPA to promulgate new recycling regulations.' 19
In the absence of statutory change, litigation has become a powerful
weapon for those interested in shaping regulatory processes. 121 Earlier in
the history of RCRA, the courts seemed to have sympathized with the
immensity of EPA's task in implementing a highly complex and technical statute. 12 1 As a result of successful lawsuits brought by environmental groups, however, the courts have increasingly imposed on the Agency
tight time schedules for promulgating regulations and implementing a
host of programs. 12 Industry and trade associations have litigated to
23
limit EPA's regulatory authority under RCRA.'
Cases involving the interpretation of statutes that are administered
by agencies are regularly adjudicated pursuant to the two-pronged Chevron test. 124 If Congress has directly spoken to the question at bar no
further analysis is required. 12 5 If the language is ambiguous, however,
the analysis proceeds and the court defers to agency interpretation based
on a permissible construction of the statute. 126 Many cases are decided
118 During his confirmation hearings before the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, Assistant Administrator Don R. Clay committed the Office of Solid Waste and
Emergency Response to a comprehensive review of the hazardous waste provisions of RCRA.
See 199) RIS, stqa note 2, at 1.
119 See Needleman, supra note 1, at 1039-40 (noting the advantages and disadvantages in
opening the process to Congress and expanding EPA's jurisdiction to regulate).
120 See Eileen Gay Jones, Riskv Assessment: Uncertainties in Science and the Human
Dimension of Environnental Decisionmaking, 22 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 1,
32 (explaining that "Jilf the public and technocrats do not resolve their differences through
deliberation," litigation becomes a viable mode of redress and the courts act "as refereels]
between scientists or technicians who disagree, or between a public demanding that the law fill
a gap because scientific research is underdeveloped, inchoate, or in nascent form").
121 See 1990 RIS, supra note 2, at 9.
122 See id.
123 See, e.g., Shell Oil Corp. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (involving a challenge to EPA's definition of "treatment," which included "processes designed to recover valuable materials from the recycling of solid wastes"); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1179
(D.C. Cir. 1990) (involving a challenge to EPA's re-listing of six wastes generated from smelting operations as "hazardous"): Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990)
(involving a challenge by environmental groups and the treatment industry to EPA's determination that it lacked the authority to establish treatment standards for slag residues from metals
recovery processes); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (involving a
challenge by representatives of the petroleum and mining industries to EPA's jurisdiction over
materials returned to the refining process and over re-processed ore and the metal derived from
it).
124 See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
125 See id.
126 See id.
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based on the literal terms of the statute, which means that the analysis
terminates before the second prong "deference to an agency's permissible interpretation" is even considered. 27 This trend dilutes the Chevron
doctrine and narrows the interpretive power of administrative agencies. 128 But the sheer amount of litigation over the scope of EPA's authority to regulate hazardous wastes illustrates the disparity of
129
conclusions that courts may reach when applying the Chevron test.
Finally, regulatory reform is also driven by public participation. In
consonance with the relatively young history of environmental law,
which has witnessed an increasing role for public participation, 131 EPA
127 See Antonin Scalia, JudicialDefrrence to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
DUKE L. J.511, 521 (writing that "lolne who finds more often (as I do) that the meaning of a
statute is apparent from its text and from its relationship with other laws, thereby finds less
often that the triggering requirement for Chevron deference exists").
128 See, e.g., Thomas W. Merill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72
WASH. U. L. Q. 351 (1994) (finding an "inverse relationship between the rise of textualism
and the waning of Ithat doctrinel"); Markus G. Puder, 18 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 507, 534 (1999)
(observing that (1) this approach may reduce deference to administrative interpretations, "despite the potential benefits of an agency's technical expertise and closeness to the regulated
community:" (2) "a weakening of Chevron may open the door for inconsistent applications of
the doctrine and jeopardize legal certainty for those actors who rely on administrative interpretations in their day-to-day operations;" and (3) agency deference should be "a full-fledged
jurisprudential doctrine in cases where the statute administered by the agency contains a general clause and the interpretation of the statute is permissible"); Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1289, 1325 (1986) (noting that the
Supreme Court has "oscillated between activism and restraint in reviewing agency decisions").
129 See Shell Oil Co. v. EPA, 950 F.2d 741 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding EPA's recycling
regulations consistent with clear congressional intent); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 907 F.2d
1179 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (remanding to EPA for a fuller explanation of its decision to list six new
wastes under RCRA): Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (concluding that RCRA is ambiguous as to EPA's authority to regulate K061 slag, and that a
permissible construction of the relevant portions "must comport with the broader 'statutory
purpose' of the RCRA"); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(holding that EPA acted in contravention of Congress' intent in regulating in-process secondary materials, because "Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed its intent that 'solid
waste' be limited to materials that are 'discarded'"); see also Malloy, supra note 8, at 19-29
(opining that the four decisions provide a "solid jurisdictional basis" for a hazardous waste
recycling permitting system); Needleman, supra note 1,at 1012 (concluding from these four
cases that, if secondary recyclable materials are to be exempt from RCRA jurisdiction, they
apparently must be reinserted directly into the ongoing production process and not placed on
the ground): Sweeney, supra note 6, at 21-30 (explaining the narrow nature of the holdings in
AMC et progeny when applied to specific facts).
130 See Adam N. Brain, Public Participation Provisions Need Not Contribute to Environmental Injustice, 5 TENIPLE POL. & Civ. RTS. L. R. 145, 150 n.40 (1996) (emphasizing EPA's
historic adherence to the "Jeffersonian faith" that the public has the capacity to take part in
decisions of potential impact); Jones, supra note 120, at 19, 30, 58 (discussing the importance
of including public participation activities in decisionmaking processes); Nancy Perkins
Spyke, Public Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking at the New Millennium: Structuring New Spheres of Public Influence, 26 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 263, 264, 269-70 (1999)
(discussing the development of public participation measures and opining that in recent years,
such activities have stagnated). For a case study tracing environmental decisions made informally by the government without adequate public participation, see DANIEL MAZMANIAN &
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has been a long-time advocate for integrating public participation activities into regulatory decision processes.' 3' RCRA specifically directs
EPA to provide for public involvement in the development, revision, implementation, and enforcement of any regulation, guideline, information,
or program.' 32 Since public participation takes various shapes 133 and
features different agents 134 , EPA has promulgated regulations 135 and issued policy statements 136 to meet the statutory mandate. Both establish
uniform requirements and directions to public officials who manage and
37
conduct EPA programs.1
EPA applies its public participation requirements to a wide range of
decisions and actions. 13x The Agency has embraced a broad notion of
DAVID MORELL, BEYOND SUPERFAILURE: AMERICA'S

Toxics POLICY FOR THE 1990s 58-76

(1992). For a critical analysis of public participation, see Jones, supra note 120, at 66 (discussing the concern that public sentiment is grounded in "cognitive limitations, biased information sources, cognitive dissidence, control, or framing bias").
131 See, e.g., EPA, RCRA IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL 2-1 (1993) (encouraging public involvement beyond the formal requirements of the regulations to foster a meaningful dialogue
among the public, the Agency, and the regulated entity); MARY GRISEZ KWEIT & ROBERT W.
KWEIT, IMPLEMENTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN A BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY: A CONTINGENCY

APPROACH 31 (1981): STUART LANGTON, What is Citizen Participation? ill CITIZEN PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA 13 (Stuart Langton ed., 1978): Charles Fox, A Real Public Role, THE ENVTL.
FOR., Nov./Dec. 1998, at 19, 21 (describing EPA stakeholder involvement activities and approaches from a senior agency official's perspective): J. Matthew J. McKinney, Negotiated
Rulemaking: Involving Citizens inl Public Decisions, 6(0 MONT. L. REV. 499, 502 (1999) (finding that EPA has been the most consistent and committed user of negotiated rulemaking at the
federal level, accounting for about one-third of federal "reg-negs"); Spyke, supra, note 130, at
266.
132 The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6974(b) (1999).
133 See Spyke, supra note 130, at 267 (listing (1) the broad forms of education, information, review and reaction, and interaction and dialogue; and (2) the specific examples of lobbying, public advocacy and protest, public hearings, solicitation of public comments, political
party involvement, voting, payment of taxes, jury service, and litigation). For a discussion of
the controversy over the relation between public participation and litigation, see Bram, supra
note 13(0, at 154, 158 (asserting that meaningful citizen involvement may avert litigation);
Jones, supra note 120 at 28-30 (characterizing litigation as an inferior form of public
participation).
134 See Bram, supra note 13(0, at 149 (explaining that "a public consists of a number of
people reacting to a perceived interest"); Spyke, stnra note 130, at 267 (observing that the
public, the government, the electoral process, or legal mandates generate participation).
135 See 4(1 C.F.R. pt. 25 (covering public participation programs under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, the Safe Drinking Water Act, and the Clean Water Act).
136 See 46 Fed. Reg. 5,736 (Jan. 19, 1981) (containing the Final EPA Policy on Public
Participation under various federal environmental statutes).
137 4(1 C.F.R. § 25.3(a)-(b); 46 Fed. Reg. at 5,736 (explaining that EPA views public
involvement as a two-way concept: (1) opportunity and encouragement for the public at large
to express their views to the regulator; and (2) due consideration of public input, concerns,
values, and preferences).
138 See 4(1 C.F.R. § 25.2: 46 Fed. Reg. at 5,736 (listing the following activities: rulemakings, issuance, modification, and enforcement of permits, development of information material, certain strategy and policy guidance memoranda, financially assisted planning and
programming, state primacy approval, and other activities deemed appropriate).
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the public participant, which combines the general populace and identifiable segments of the public, including industry and business, trade associations, environmental organizations, consumers, health advocates,
recreational and educational groups, organized labor, and federal, state,
local, and tribal govemments. 139 Since a standard recipe for measuring
the effective solicitation and integration of public participation in environmental decision-making does not exist, 141' EPA views the improvement of the quality and quantity of public participation as a continuous

process. 14 1 This commitment constitutes a centerpiece of the Agency's
42
reinvention initiatives.1

III.

FLASHBACK: THE MILESTONES IN RECYCLING REFORM

As a result of self-assessments, court battles, and public participation, EPA decided to move forward with a more structured reform process.' 4 3 The evolution of the Agency's hazardous waste recycling
project may be divided into four principal stages: (1) the initial phase; (2)
the Task Force process; (3) the reduced-scale approach; and (4) the fallback to incrementation.

A.

BEGINNINGS:

1990-1992

In July 1990, EPA published a study which evaluated the Agency's
RCRA implementation record against the twin statutory goals of protecting human health and the environment, and encouraging the recovery of
resources. 14 4 Finding that the definitions of solid waste and hazardous
139 See 40 C.F.R. § 25.3(a); 46 Fed. Reg. at 5,736.
140 See Spyke, supra note 130, at 264 (observing that (I) the diverse scholarship fails to
reveal a comprehensive solution that would erase existing problems; that (2) a unifying theme
to help shape the next generation of public participation in environmental decision-making is
not on the horizon).
141 For a notice requesting public comment for potential revisions to the Agency's 1981
policy on public participation during, see 64 Fed. Reg. 66,906 (Nov. 30, 1999). See also
Spyke, supra note 130, at 300 (noting that EPA is taking steps to evaluate the successes and
failures of participation programs).
142 For reinvention discussions of stakeholder involvement, see, e.g., EPA, EPAI0O-R99-002, REINVENTING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 23 (1999) (providing that EPA's efforts

are "designed to give people more access to information so that they can understand environmental and public health issues and, if they choose, become more involved in environmental
decision-making"); EPA,. REPORT OF THE COMMON SENSE INITIATIVE COUNCIL'S STAKEHOLDER INVOLVEMENT WORKGROUP (1998) (documenting a three-fold need to: (1) integrate

stakeholder involvement activities with decision-making; (2) make clear to the public how
solicited information will be used; and (3) analyze each situation to determine the tools and
expertise needed to develop and maintain lasting agreements); EPA, THE STAKEHOLDER AcTION PLAN (1998) (advancing specific actions to improve stakeholder involvement at EPA
with respect to (1)planning and management of stakeholder involvement activities and (2)
internal and external capacities for stakeholder involvement).
143 1991) RIS, supra note 2, at v.
144 See id.
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waste were difficult to understand, implement, and enforce,' 45 EPA concluded that it was time for a significant regulatory overhaul.' 46 Reform
efforts were to clarify "who is in and out of the system," establish "a
philosophy of regulatory coverage, and consolidate and centralize the
provisions."'' 47 The Agency held several public meetings in late 1990 to
solicit information from industry, congressional staff, state officials, federal facilities, EPA regions, and environmental groups.' 4 These meetings, according to the Agency, validated the findings of its earlier
study. 149 EPA presented the results of this first round of dialogue in a
report dated July 1992.'15 1 The process for achieving a better, less overand under-inclusive definition involved fashioning a federal regulatory
system for recycling tailored to different recycling categories, creating
state requirements in RCRA-authorized jurisdictions, and making limited
5
revisions to other parts of RCRA.' '
B.

TASK FORCE PROCESS:

1992-1995

In October 1992, EPA's Office of Solid Waste chartered the Definition of Solid Waste Task Force. The internal Agency workgroup was
directed to formulate specific solutions for resolving the problems associated with the hazardous waste recycling regulations.' 52 The threeprong objective of the Task Force included eliminating impediments to
hazardous waste recycling, correcting over- and under-regulation of recycling, and clarifying and possibly simplifying applicable
53
regulations.'
The Task Force first held meetings with industry representatives,
environmental groups, and State agency personnel. '54 Second, it conducted site visits involving different kinds of recycling operations.' 55
Third, the Task Force convened a sixteen-member dialogue group, the
Solid Waste Definition Roundtable, and solicited technical comments
from practitioners in hazardous waste management.' 56 Finally, the Task
145 See id. at 38 (observing that (1)in 1989, an average of over I,(X)() calls were received
by the RCRA Hotline on these definitions, which was approximately one-third of all Hotline
calls received on the hazardous waste regulations, and (2) the RCRA program faced the challenge of having to cover highly diverse industrial situations).
146 See id.
147 Id.
148 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 3-1.
149 See id.
'50 See EPA, EPA530-R-92-021, RCRA IMPLEMENTATION STUDY UPDATE: THE DEFINITION OF SOLID WASTE 7 (1992).
151 See id.
152 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 1-3.
153 See id.
154 See id. at 3-1.
I55

See id.

156 See id. at 1-4, 3-5.

114

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10:95

Force met with representatives from the Association of State and Territorial Solid Waste Management Officials to develop initial proposals and
obtain feedback.157 In April 1993, the Task Force presented a number of
options for revising the definition of solid waste regulations.1 58 Between
July and November 1993, the Task Force held a series of Roundtable
technical meetings, brainstormed more detailed alternatives, and developed a straw proposal. 159 While the Task Force proposals were being
finalized, EPA promulgated a rule excluding oil from petroleum-refinery
wastewater from the definition of "solid waste" and expanding the existing exemption for petroleum coke. 1 60 In September 1994, the Task
Force released its final recommendations, which are summarized
below. 161
The Task Force proposed the establishment of three regulatory
levels to advance tailored controls and oversight. 162 The first tier was to
retain, introduce, and eliminate exclusions and exemptions for recycling. 163 The Task Force proposed that the processing of statutorily
excluded materials should be exempt from RCRA Subtitle C.164 In addition, the Task Force floated new exemptions for direct reuse of secondary materials containing hydrocarbons in thermal processes at a
petroleum refinery, 165 direct reuse of secondary materials containing hydrocarbons when returned for blending into commercial grade gasoline at
a petroleum refinery, 166 recovery of energy from "clean" waste-derived
fuels,167 and incidental processing.16 All exemptions were to be subject
to management prohibitions directed at land placement, 69 burning or use
157 See id.
158 See id. at 3-3 to 3-4.
159 See id. at 3-5.
160 See 59 Fed. Reg. 38,536 (July 28, 1994) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 261, 266) (explaining that (1)the new exclusion also applies to recovered oil from off-site sources owned by a
different company, while refinery wastewaters are still considered a solid waste; and (2) the
expansion covers coke produced by a single petroleum refining entity, even if the coker is
located separately from the facility where the wastes are generated).
161 See Draft Report fi'om EPA Task Force on Definition ol Solid Waste under RCRA
Dated April 22, 1994, DAILY ENV'T. REP. (BNA), SPECIAL SUPPLEMENT, Apr. 28, 1994 [here-

inafter Draft Reportl. For an in-depth description and analysis of the report's content, see
Sweeney, supra note 6,at 30-74.
162 See Draft Report, supra note 161, at 3-5.
163 See id.

164 See id. at 4-6 to 4-8 (listing exclusions and their criteria).
165 See id. at 4-3 to 4-4 (explaining the purpose and scope of the exemption).
166 See id. at 4-4 (providing the purpose and scope of the exemption).
167 /d. at 4-3 (describing the exemption and noting that EPA will develop a specific regulatory definition).
168 See id. at 4-4 to 4-5 (offering the rationale for the exemption).
169 See id. at 4-2 to 4-3 (stipulating storage requirements for exempt materials).
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to produce a fuel, 17t ' and speculative accumulation.' 7' In addition, a determination of status and notification was to be required. 72 Finally, the
Task Force proposed rescinding existing exemptions for spent materials
transported off-site for direct reuse 173 and recycling of characteristic
sludges.

'74

The second tier proposed tailored standards in lieu of full RCRA
permitting for four recycling classes: direct reuse off-site of spent materials and recovery of precious metals (Category A); 175 on-site recycling
(Category B);'

76

captive recycling and product stewardship (Category

17 7

and off-site commercial recycling (Category D). 178 All four classes were to be prohibited from land storage, 179 speculative accumulation' 81 and use of toxics along for the ride ("TAR").'' The TAR was to
determine the legitimacy of recycling operations, which was to be measured via three alternative testing regimes. 8 2 One approach, a self-implementing analytical method, would have required comparable levels of
hazardous constituents in recycled products and in similar goods made
from virgin materials. 18 3 In the alternative, a manufacturer or industry
would have been enabled to apply for a variance from the TAR threshold
C);

170

See id. at 4-3 (stating that, except for the three new fuel exemptions and the current

petroleum exemptions, EPA would continue to regulate recycling that includes burning secondary materials for energy recovery or to produce a fuel).
171 See ul. at 4-5 to 4-6 (explaining the durational limits on speculative accumulation onor off-site and the accompanying notification requirements).
172 See id. at 4-6 (emphasizing that (1) the recycler would have to prepare and keep on file
a status determination that includes the grounds for claiming the exclusion or exemption; and
(2) in certain instances, the recycler would have to notify the State or EPA).
173 See id. at 5-7 (stating that spent materials sent off-site for direct reuse without reclamation would be placed into the stricter controlled recycling class to assure appropriate transportation of these materials).
174 See id. (observing that these emission-control residues, which are currently not regulated because of the difficulties of distinguishing between the reclamation of product-like and
waste-like sludges, would be better managed in the tailored recycling tier).
175 See id. at 5-2 to 5-3 (explaining the goal of ensuring that materials are not "lost"
between generation and reuse).
176 See id. at 5-3 to 5-4 (noting that this type of recycling, which occurs at the generating
facility, requires further processing that cannot be accomplished through the excluded closedloop recycling).
177 See id. at 5-4 to 5-6 (observing that intracompany recycling and product stewardship
foster the reuse of materials otherwise destined for treatment or disposal).
178 See id. at 5-6 (explaining that the products created by a commercial recycling facility
are made primarily from ingredients other than virgin materials).
179 See id. at 5-8 to 5-9 (discussing the rationale of groundwater protection).
180 See id. at 5-23 to 5-25 (proposing accumulation time limits of 18 months for Category
B and 12 months for Categories C and D).
181 See id. at 5-9 to 5-12 (describing "sham" recycling as treating or disposing of hazardous waste in the guise of legitimate recycling).
182 See id.
183 See id.
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and demonstrate a functional need or industry specification. 18 4 Finally, a
variance would have been available upon a showing of insignificant risk
to human health or the environment over the life of the recycled product.'8

5

In addition to the prohibitions on land storage, speculative ac-

cumulation, and TAR, the second tier would have required state or EPA
notification, biennial reporting, 1 6 and "recyclable materials" manifests
for offsite shipments. 8 7 Categories B through D were to impose management standards upon operations plans, 88 certifications, 8 9 tanks, containers, and containment buildings, 191 emission control, 19 1 unit release
response, 192 reporting of facility modifications, 193 and closure and financial assistance assurance. 194 In addition, Category C requirements were
to include giving public notice and granting access to non-proprietary
material. 195 Category D was to be subject to prior approval and full pub96
lic participation. '
The third recycling category was to be governed by full RCRA Subtitle C regulation. Recycling of used oil 197 and inherently waste-like
materials, 198 as well as activities and materials excluded from the first
tier' 99 or identified through future designations, were to be subject to the
full brunt of hazardous waste management regulation.
The recommendations garnered mixed reactions from the participants in the Task Force process. Industry's approval was limited to sec184 See id.
185 See id.
186 See id. at 5-12 to 5-13 (noting that the biennial reporting requirements would be new

only for Category A).
187 See id. at 5-13 to 5-14 (explaining that the new manifests would not be associated with
a hazardous waste stigma).
88 See id. at 5-22 to 5-23 (recommending a simplified two-part plan).
189 See id. at v (stating that certifications would replace full RCRA permits).
19( See id. at 5-16 to 5-20 (proposing the adoption of pertinent treatment, storage, and
disposal facility standards).
191 See id. at 5-20 to 5-21 (supporting the adoption of regulations under the Clean Air Act
and its amendments).
192 See id. at 5-30 to 5-33 (explaining that spill response requirements would replace
facility-wide corrective action).
193 See id. at 5-25 to 5-28 (recommending a streamlined administrative process).
194 See id. at 5-28 to 5-30 (proposing a "cookbook" approach for a tailored worksheet that
would be submitted at the time of closure).
195 See id. at 5-33 to 5-35 (identifying a threshold of 12,110( kg/yr of secondary materials
received to trigger the requirement).
196 See id. (outlining the major elements that would require government approval).
197 See id. at 5-36 (emphasizing that rules pertaining to used oil management would not
change).
198 See id. at 5-36 to 5-37 (presenting the examples of dioxins and certain materials fed to
halogen acid furnaces).
199 Id. at 5-37 (providing the examples of waste-derived products or illegitimate materials, landfilling, land storage, burning for destruction, and speculative accumulation limits).
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tor-specific first tier proposals. 2111 Oil refiners, chemical manufacturers,
and electric utilities applauded the flexibility associated with the new
exemptions2 1t ' and selected tailored management standards under the intermediate tier.2 2 The same groups, however, rejected the bulk of the
recommendations. 213 Industry representatives were willing to negotiate
the design of the management standards under the second tier,2114 but
See Telephone Interview with Jim O'Leary, supra note 92.
Industry representatives applauded the two new exemptions for direct reuse of hydrocarbons at a petroleum refinery. See Stakeholders Assessing Positions on EPA Proposal to
Redefine Solid Waste, DAILY ENV'T. REP. (BNA), Apr. 28, 1994 at A4 [hereinafter Stakeholders Assessing]; Letter from S.R. Emery, Amoco, to James Berlow, Director, Definition of
Solid Waste Task Force, EPA (June 17, 1994) (on file with author) (stating that (1) the use of
secondary materials to produce a fuel at a petroleum refinery is essentially a chemical production process, not a process that blends hazardous waste fuels for combustion at an industrial
facility; and (2) the imposition of RCRA tank standards would discourage recycling). Others
favored the removal of clean-buming fuels from hazardous waste regulations goveming burners and industrial fumaces. See Telephone Interview with Jamie Conrad, Chemical Manufacturers Association (Nov.21, 1994) (on file with author) (observing that (1) 17 million gallons
of these (liquid) fuels are generated nationwide per year; and (2) a fuel-specification approach
to the definition with fixed percentages for certain constituents would be favored); Letter from
James R. Roewer, USWAG, to James Berlow, Director, Definition of Solid Waste Task Force,
EPA (Feb. 15, 1994) (on file with author) (emphasizing that (1) while electric utilities do not
generate a significant amount of clean fuels, electric utilities operate high-efficiency boilers
that are ideal for clean fuel activities: and (2) a broadened clean fuels definition should also
include materials which exhibit the toxicity characteristic for benzene or other non-chlorinated
organics normally found in non-waste fuels). Still others welcomed the incidental processing
exemption. See Roundtable Group, supra note 14 at A4; Letter from Emery, supra (stating
that drying, filtering, and screening to remove impurities should be considered incidental to
avoid the interpretation of these activities as "reclamation before reuse"). Finally, some representatives applauded the exemption of Bevill Wastes. See UTILITY SOLID WASTE ACTIVITIES
GROUP, MAJOR ELECTRIC UTILITY INDUSTRY ISSUES PENDING BEFORE EPA's OFFICE OF SOLID
WASTE, RCRA DOCKET DSWP-50145 (1994): Telephone Interview with Andrew O'Hare,
American Petroleum Institute (Oct. 12, 1994) (on file with author) (explaining that (1) produced waters, which constitute most of oil and gas exploration and production wastes, may be
re-injected underground for water flooding; (2) fluid drillings may be reconditioned for closedloop drilling; and (3) drill cuttings may be recycled as road fill, gravel, and cement mix).
202 See, e.g., CHET M. THOMSON, METALS INDUSTRY RECYCLING COALITION, REDEFINI200
201

6 (1995) (welcoming release response instead of
full-blown corrective action because of cost and time savings); Letter from Emery, supra note
201 (providing an example of the new recycling opportunities for spent materials under Category A): Letter from Roewer, supra note 201 (commenting that the intermediate standards for
captive and on-site recycling may greatly enhance the ability of utilities across the nation to
recycle solvents, antifreeze, discarded commercial chemical products, and other characteristic
hazardous wastes).
203 See Roundtable Group, supra note 14, at A4.
204 For criticisms of the tailored RCRA recycling tier, see Stakeholders Assessing, supra
201 at A5 (providing a challenge to the incentive value provided by the new transportation
manifest); Telephone Interview with Jamie Conrad, supra note 211 (suggesting that onsite
recycling activities under Category B should be exempt subject to notification requirements);
Letter from Emery, supra note 201 (providing specific examples of potentially significant
burdens imposed under Categories B and C); Letter from Neil Jay King, Wilmer, Cutler, and
Pickering, to James Berlow, Director, Definition of Solid Waste Task Force, EPA (June 28,
1994) (on file with the Cornell Journal of Law and Public Polic,) (questioning the distinction
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viewed the Agency's approach toward delineation of jurisdiction 205 and
the proposed regime for toxics along for the ride2t 6 as deal busters. According to the environmental community, the Task Force proposals fell
short in protecting human health and the environment. 20 7 The states emphasized that their implementation and enforcement dilemmas would
continue if the recommendations were codified.0x All parties agreed
between "off-site commercial recycling" and intracompany "captive" recycling or product
stewardship arrangements): Letter from Roewer to Berlow, supra note 201 (characterizing the
public notice requirement for Category C as a deterrent to recycling because of public anxieties associated with perceived waste management activities): Summary of Definition of Solid
Waste Public Meeting of September 20, 1994, RCRA Docket DSWP-50145 (1994) 1hereinafter Public Meeting Summary] (discussing the view that the lack of detail provided for financial
assurance requirements and the potentially significant closure costs under RCRA may discourage capital investments in new recycling technologies);. For an indication of room for further
negotiation, see Telephone Interview with Marilyn Goode, Office of Solid Waste, EPA and
Member of the Definition of Solid Waste Task Force, (Dec. 2, 1994) (on file with author)
(noting that the Agency has taken under advisement a proposal by the National Environmental
Development Association for conditionally exempting on-site recycling).
205 For sources discussing the controversy over jurisdiction, see Stakeholders Assessing,
supra 201, at A4: Letter from Andrew T. O'Hare, American Petroleum Institute, to James
Berlow, Director, Definition of Solid Waste Task Force, EPA (June 1, 1994) (on file with the
Cornell Journal of Law and Public Policv) (disputing RCRA jurisdiction over materials that
are used on-site or off-site as ingredients, substitutes for commercial products, or substitutes
for/supplements to raw materials or feedstocks without prior reclamation or processing); Letter
from Krishna Parameswaran, ASARCO, to James Berlow, Director, Definition of Solid Waste
Task Force, EPA (May 23, 1994) (on file with the Cor'nellJournal of Law and Public Policv)
(arguing that RCRA Subtitle C requirements were developed to address treatment, storage, and
disposal of hazardous waste, as opposed to "beneficial" resource recovery and recycling); Public Meeting Summary, supra note 204; see also Industr' Optimistic EPA Is Considering lurisdiction In Dtefinition

.f Solid Waste, DAILY ENV'T REP. (BNA), Jan.

11,

1995, at A6

Telephone Interview with James Berlow, Director, Definition of Solid Waste Task Force, EPA
(Dec. 2, 1994) (on file with author) (noting the Agency's plan to analyze specific waste
streams by industry sectors and then decide their future regulatory status).
2(16 For widespread opposition against the test based on questions of feasibility, cost, design, and necessity, see Stakeholders Assessing, supra note 201, at A4: Letter from King,
supra note 204 (proposing a "call-in" approach that would be triggered when EPA or the state
specifically question the legitimacy of a recycling process); Letter from Roewer to Berlow,
supra note 201 (indicating that only a few laboratories would be capable of testing for toxics
along for the ride at a cost of over $4,00)0 per test): Public Meeting Summary, supra note 204
(recommending that the test be limited to "consumer products" because they may pose the
greatest likelihood of impact on human health).
207 For resistance in the environmental community against the number and scope of the
exemptions as well as the alleged jurisdictional concessions, see Stakeholders Assessing, supra
note 201, at A4: HWTC Testimony, supra note 4, at 4-5 (suggesting that bad recycling is worse
than good treatment and disposal); Hazardous Waste Provisions, 1991: Hearings on S. 976
and S. 982 Before the Subconim. on Envtl. Prot. of the S. Comm. on Env't and Pub. Works,
102nd Cong. 2 (1991) (testimony of Karen Florini, Senior Attorney, Environmental Defense
Fund) at 2 (observing that "poor quality recycling is no better than high-quality disposal:
indeed, it is generally worse").
208 See BUSINESS RECYCLING COALITION, SUMMARY OF STATE COMMENTS ON REENGINEERING RCRA FOR [HAZARDOUS WASTE] RECYCLING 2 (1995) (reflecting the states' hesi-

tancy to reach candid conclusions over whether the Task Force Report offers a better than the
current system).
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that the Task Force Report did not offer a more understandable regulatory system. 2" 9 In sum, nobody moved to strike the kind of compromise
that would have carried the Task Force proposals into the formal
rulemaking phase.
C.

REDUCED-SCALE APPROACH:

1995-1997

After some internal consideration and informal discussions with interested parties, EPA's Office of Solid Waste replaced the Task Force
process with a smaller-scale effort. 2 1 The cast of players was reduced to
selected Agency and state officials. Moreover, the scope of the recycling
reform was re-focused on simplification and jurisdiction. After almost
two years of deliberations, in November 1996, EPA conducted a public
2
meeting and presented options for re-defining RCRA jurisdiction. 1' According to the proposal, federal rules were to be replaced with a new
concept of recycling2 12 predicated on either the "transfer-based"2
'

13

or the

214

"in-commerce
approach.
Under the transfer-based option, the recycling location, the recycling manner, and the degree of a material's commodity-likeness were
to serve as the determinants for the onset of RCRA jurisdiction. 21 5 The
transfer-based approach was to exclude from the solid waste definition
materials recycled on-site or within the same company, subject to certain
management prohibitions. 21 6 The material was to be disallowed from
being burned for energy recovery or used to produce a product that
would be burned for energy recovery; 21 7 stored or otherwise managed on
the land; 218 used in a manner constituting disposal or used to make a
209 Telephone Interview with Jim O'Leary, stqra note 92 (observing that simplicity was a

"casualty" of the scope of the project).
211) After reviewing the Task Force Report, Elliot Laws, the EPA Assistant Administrator
for the Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, directed the Office of Solid Waste to
work with interested states and craft a new approach to the regulation of hazardous waste
recycling. See Malloy, supra note 8, at 2 n.6.
211 BRIEFING DOCUMENT, suqra note 15; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15.
212 For the underlying definition of the term "recycling", see BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra
note 15, at 8 (explaining that legitimate "recycling," the use of a secondary material to produce
a good, involves the following conditions: (1) the product of recycling is sold, or otherwise has
a demonstrable economic value: (2) the secondary material makes a significant contribution to
the recycling process or the product: (3) no significant increase in levels of toxic constituents
occurs: and (4) the secondary material is managed to minimize loss): OPTIONS PAPER, supra
note 15, at 3.
213 BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 2-4: OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 1-8.
214 BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 5-7; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 8-9.
215 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supqra note 15, at 2; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 1.
216 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, Sutpra note 15, at 3-4; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 4-5.
217 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, stra
note 15, at 3; OPTIONS PAPER, SUpra note 15, at 4.
218 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 3: OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 4
(referring to EPA's regulatory land disposal definition).
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product that would be used in a manner constituting disposal; 2 19 speculatively accumulated; 220 or designated as inherently waste-like. 22 1 In addition, the exclusion was to be conditioned on certain basic record keeping
and notification requirements. 222 If the generator failed to comply with
these management conditions, hazardous secondary materials were to be
controlled by streamlined or full hazardous waste management regulation. 223 However, despite their failure to meet the requirements of the
transfer-based option, certain materials that were more "commodity-like"
than "waste-like" still were to be granted exclusion from RCRA jurisdiction. 224 EPA further proposed a streamlined, nationally issued "general
permit" process for off-site hazardous waste recyclers which, under the
transfer-based approach, would be required to obtain a RCRA treatment
225
or storage permit.
Under the in-commerce option hazardous waste management controls were to be determined according to the type of recycling activity in
question. 226 All recycled materials were to be potentially excluded from
the definition of solid waste, subject to the same conditions outlined
under the transfer-based option, including management prohibitions, record-keeping and notification requirements, and counter exceptions for
2 27
commodity-like wastes.
Environmentalists and industry officials vehemently criticized
EPA's proposals and urged the Agency to abandon the two options. 228
The states and the environmental community argued that the proposals,
especially the in-commerce approach, would exempt too many materials
from RCRA without adequate environmental protection. 229 Industry representatives asserted that the proposals would bring more materials into
RCRA jurisdiction and complicate rather than streamline recycling

219 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 3; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 4.
220 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 3; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 4
(noting that the definition of speculative accumulation would be modified to allow 18 months
of speculative accumulation wherein 100% of the material must be recycled).
221 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, stqa note 15, at 3: OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 4.
222 See OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 2; BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 4.
223 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 2; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 5.
224 BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 2, 9: OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 5-6
(explaining that a list of "commodity-like" materials and a case-specific variance procedure
would be established).
225 BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 10-16; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 6-8.
226 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 5; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 8.
227 See BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 15, at 5-7; OPTIONS PAPER, supra note 15, at 8-9.
228 See Telephone Interview with Chip Biterelis, Office of Solid Waste, EPA, (Feb. 2,
1998) (on file with author).
229

See id,
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rules. 23) Small business groups criticized EPA's options for imposing
23
significant economic burdens on their operations. '

D.

INCREMENTATION:

1997

TO THE PRESENT

In late 1997, EPA aborted any further pursuit of the two alternative
approaches and returned to the drawing board. This decision was based
on public input and the Agency's own realization that it needed a better
understanding of the environmental and economic consequences of the
two options. 232 EPA decided to focus on fixes around the edges of the
current system, collect comprehensive data, assess the experiences with
currently exempt materials, and understand risks resulting from recycling. 233 Incremental improvements contemplated by EPA in early
1998 included crafting a regulatory exclusion for commodity-like materials, establishing a super-variance with a streamlined petition process,
providing regulatory relief for product stewardship activities, formulating
new legitimacy criteria for recycling operations, and drafting readable
regulations. 234 The plans never materialized. However, EPA did promulgate some sector-specific rules. 235 In addition, the Agency has been

quietly making system clarifications through administrative guidance
236
short of formal rule-making.
IV.

FINDINGS AND PERSPECTIVES

More than ten years after EPA officially acknowledged the need for
comprehensive recycling reform, 237 the regulatory picture has not
230 See id. (discussing the industry position that the transfer-based option would increase
compliance costs by subjecting materials to RCRA jurisdiction for the first time only because
they were sent off-site for recycling).
231 See id.
232 See Telephone Interview with Chip Biterelis, supra note 228.
233 See Letter from Elizabeth A. Cotsworth, Acting Director, Office of Solid Waste, EPA,
to Jeffrey Gunnulfson, Chemical Manufacturers Association (October 7, 1997) (on file with
author) (explaining that EPA would: (1) propose the standardized permit that was part of the
transfer-based option: (2) develop a data collection approach to make improvements in estimating the types and quantities of currently exempt recyclable materials, and in understanding
the management practices pertaining to such materials; and (3) propose selected incremental
improvements to the current framework).
234 See EPA Plans, supra note 17, at 3.
235 See Telephone Interview with Charlotte Mooney, Office of Solid Waste, EPA (Mar.
23, 2000) (on file with author) (explaining that reform steps are developed in consonance with
EPA's Project XL initiatives).
236 See, e.g., Sparking Industr, Concerns, EPA Eyes Clarification of RCRA Hazardous
Waste RecYcling Rules, INSmE EPA's SUPERFUND REPORT, Nov. 13, 2000 at 18 (reporting on
new guidance to states that addresses the definition of certain types of recyclable hazardous
materials, especially "incidental processing").
237 See 1990 RIS, supra note 2, at 38. The definition of recycled waste is significant also
in determining the transboundary movement of wastes. See, e.g., TASK FORCE REPORT, supra
note 13, at 6-7 (emphasizing that if recycled hazardous waste were excluded or exempted from

122

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 10:95

changed substantially. After two unsuccessful attempts to achieve a new
framework, the Agency's subsequent efforts seem incremental at best.
The reform process was plagued by several factors, including the complexity and size of the project, the general data deficit, and the diverse
238
spectrum of interested parties.
Congress has largely left the operational implementation of RCRA's
"multi-media, multi-material, multi-activity," 239 and multi-objective programs 24 with EPA and the courts. The hazardous waste recycling arena
vividly illustrates this quagmire. Hazardous waste recycling advances
the recovery of resources, one of RCRA's main objectives, and, after
waste minimization, constitutes the next preferred method for hazardous
waste management. 24 1 Unsafe practices and sham operations, however,
raise environmental concerns.
The combination of the ambitious, often overlapping statutory goals
and EPA's efforts to balance hazardous waste recycling and environmental protection through interference with industrial production 242 has resuited in a complex regulatory web of definitions and a sentiment of
the definition of hazardous waste, the export restrictions of the Basel Convention would not be
triggered, and EPA would not be able to know whether the receiving country had an equally
protective approach in place): William Schneider, The Basel Convention Ban on Hazardous
Waste Exports: Paradigm of Effi'ciencv, or Exercise in Futility?, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.
REV. 247 (Winter, 1996) (providing a detailed description of the Basel Convention); Basel
Convention Ban on OECD E.ports Hinges on Definition of Recy('led Waste, INT'L ENV'T.
DAILY (BNA), Sep.20, 1995, at 1.
238 See Telephone Interview with Charlotte Mooney, suipra note 235 (noting that EPA is
in the process of finalizing a limited data collection effort).
239 RICHARD C. FORTUNA, HAZARDOUS WASTE TREATMENT COUNCIL, REVISING RCRA
OF SOLID WASTE TO CONTROL HAZARDOUS WASTE RECYCLING PRACTICES I
(1990) 1hereinafter HWTC REPORTI.
240 For general language in RCRA demonstrating congressional intent to foster bona fide
recycling, see The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (1994) (emphasizing the need to reduce landfilling and domestic dependence on imports); Id. § 6901a
(finding it in the national interest to recycle used oil); Id. § 6902 (identifying as the fundamental objectives of RCRA health and environment protection as well as the conservation of valuable material and energy resources, in part through waste minimization, process substitution,
materials recovery, properly conducted recycling and reuse, and treatment). See also Needleman, supra note 1, at 979-80 (observing that Congress has been focusing on the municipal
solid waste crisis, whereas hazardous waste recycling has not received much congressional
attention).
241 See Comella, supra note 3, at 415 (explaining that next to waste reduction, the methods of waste management in order of preference are recycling, then treatment, and, as a last
resort, land disposal); see also Pollution Prevention Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 131(11-13109
(1994) (placing waste reduction at the top of waste management priorities); 53 Fed. Reg.
31,138, 31,181 (Aug. 17, 1988) (expressing EPA's preference for recycling and recovery as
the best method for treating a waste, as well as eliminating or reducing the residual to be
disposed).
242 ROBERT V. PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 217
(1992).
DEFINITION
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perplexity among the regulated community and others. 24 3 The continuing court battles over the boundaries of the solid waste definition indicate
that petitioners are willing to litigate the manifold scenario-specific nuances of the discard issue and the limits of EPA's recycling jurisdiction. 244 The line between wastes and recycled products remains hazy.
The sketchy regulatory baseline was compounded by the absence of
comprehensive data that would have helped focus and guide the decision
process. 245 The information presented during the discussions was cursory, generic, and often anecdotal. 246 The lack of more reliable data has
curtailed EPA's ability to communicate effectively with all interested
parties throughout the reform process. Each interest group interpreted
the limited data in a different way to infer, extrapolate, and advocate in
furtherance of its own agenda. 247 A common factual universe never

materialized.
EPA's efforts to move forward with comprehensive recycling reform were ultimately stymied by the haggling over "who" and "how"
those in the diverse spectrum of interested parties might or should have
benefited from changes in the regulatory program.2 48 Industry interests,
243 See, e.g., HWTC Testimony, supra note 4, at 16 (observing that the exceptions to
EPA's solid and hazardous waste system are responsible for the scheme's complexity); HWTC
REPORT, supra note 239, at I (alluding to "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma");
Gaba, supra note 33, at 634 n.63 (noting that "the first step of the journey into the wonders of
EPA's definition of solid waste" is "the nicely circular situation that a waste must be a solid
waste to be a hazardous waste and hazardous to be a solid waste"); Sweeney, supra note 6, at 3
(stating that recycling is a concept associated with a wide range of meanings); Williams &
Cannon, supra note 44, at 10,063 (characterizing the system as "a blessing and a curse").
244 See HWTC Testimony, stqura note 4, at 18. For a summary of more recent litigation,
see Court Afirms Agene, Limitations to Regulate Recyclable Material, INSIDE EPA's
SUPERFUND REPORT, Apr. 26, 200, at 16 (summarizing (I) a federal appeals court decision
that unanimously struck down portions of EPA's final rule governing the storage of recyclable
waste generated by mineral processing; and (2) an ongoing case over hazardous waste listings
of petroleum wastes).
245 See 1990 RIS, supra note 2, at 41 (finding that (1) "[dlata on the hazardous waste
management industry have not been collected, analyzed, and used effectively in the development of regulations under IRCRAI Subtitle C;" (2) "Itlhe establishment of national regulatory
priorities is impaired by insufficient knowledge of the number and type of facilities handling
different types of waste streams:" and (3) "Itihe limited availability of data has also hurt
EPA's ability to communicate effectively with the public, Congress, and the regulated
community").
246 But see Malloy, supra note 8, at 17 (asserting that EPA can no longer avoid this
difficult issue by asserting a lack of information because the Agency's knowledge of the recycling industry, waste stream compositions, and recycling technologies, has increased
dramatically).
247 Gerald Torres, Environmental Burdens and Democratic Justice, 21 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 431, 435 (1994) (detailing information necessary for meaningful public input). But see
Baruch Fischoff, Risk Perception and Communication Unplugged: Twenty Years of Process,
15 RIsK ANALYSIS 137, 140(11995) (concluding that too much information can lead to confusion in decision-making).
248 For the view that public participation occasionally triumphs where narrow interests
pre-dominate, see Spyke, supra note 130, at 264.
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environmental groups, and experts "rather than the public at large" dominated the process by leveraging their knowledge and resources. Reflecting a general trend in the environmental arena, public participation was
characterized by a high degree of institutionalization. Special interests
have become increasingly active in the environmental arena. 249 Moreover, citizen stakeholders have often contented themselves with paying
membership dues and allowing interest groups to act on their behalf,
leveraging their technical expertise and funding sources.251 1 The big
players in the recycling reform process were convinced that their individ-

ual involvement guaranteed the achievement of their ambitious goals. 25'
The Agency, on the other hand, attempted to accommodate as many

views as possible and sacrificed administrative efficiency, expertise, and
control 252
The different phases of EPA's recycling reform activities produced
different types of public participation patterns. The Task Force embraced a broad pluralistic format encouraging all competing views to
come to the table at the earliest time possible.2 5 3 Through the Task
Force process, EPA attempted to move away from antiquated announceand-defend decision-making models that seek quick approval of pre-determined solutions. 254 The Task Force brought together regulators and
stakeholders at the genesis of the reform process and shared the direction
of the envisaged reform path at an early juncture in the process, before
any ink of envisaged regulatory language was put on paper. 255 Moreover, EPA invested considerable staff time and funding into the Task
Force process. But the Task Force's outreach practices unearthed con249 See id. at 265-296 (observing that the decline in political parties corresponds with the
growth in public and special interest group influence).
25) See Bram, supra note 130, at 157 (reasoning that, in many instances, individuals do
not partake in decision-making processes because they (I) feel that others are representing
their interests; (2) do not believe that the impact of the decision justifies public participation;
(3) are not be aware that a particular decision affects them; and (4) assume that they cannot
change the decision); Jones, supra note 120 at 45 (emphasizing the growing chasm between
experts and the public).
251 See Spyke, supra note 130, at 273, 292 (observing that public participants may bring
high expectations to environmental programs and lodge many standard complaints as well).
252 See id. (noting that public participation programs may demand large amounts of time
and cost, pose management problems, result in lowest-common-denominator solutions, and
conflict with the administrative goal of efficiency).
253 For an example of EPA's efforts to foster consensus building at the earliest time possible, see Lawrence E. Susskind, Overview of Developments in Public Participation in PUBLIC
PARTICIPATION IN ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONMAKING

2, 2

(ABA Public Service Division,

Standing Committee on Environmental Law, ed. 1994).
254 For a general discussion of the prevailing culture in many agencies, see Jones, supra
note 120, at 14-25 (explaining that "in many cases the agency 'defines the agenda,' the
Iagency chooses the game, the public plays in the last inning at best"'): Spyke, supra note 130,
at 292 (observing that environmental decision-makers may be reluctant to give up power).
255 See id. at 287 (explaining that a successful consensus process requires all interested
parties to develop tangible proposals and then debate the merits).
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flicting goals, strategies, and assessments among the participants and the
decision-makers as well as among the participants themselves.2 56 The
ensuing stalemate brought the process to a grinding halt. Thus, the Task
Force report at least forced an abortive decision, thus avoiding any further lingering. In the next stage, EPA attempted to galvanize consensus
around core areas of reform. The Agency embraced a format that was
significantly reduced in scope and number of players. Moreover, EPA
prepared less formalized discussion language. Yet, these somewhat altered process ingredients did not assuage the seemingly cemented unwillingness to compromise among the interested parties. The Agency finally
opted for incremental fixes and reverted to the more traditional template
of notice of proposal, opportunity for comment, and promulgation of a
final rule.
Some observers may conclude that the fragmentation of the reform
process resulted from a governance vacuum due to EPA's failure to assert regulatory will power and impose an executive decision. 257 Others
may argue that the Agency's return to "square one" was the logical consequence of a decision process that determined the existing system as the
path of least resistance; in other words, EPA merely bowed to stakeholder dynamics. The Agency was sandwiched between highly difficult
and controversial economic and environmental considerations when attempting to devise definitions and recycling rules for diverse industrial
situations. Moreover, reopening an entire web of regulations was believed to pose the specter of new waves of litigation.
The proposition that EPA was overtaxed by the sheer size of the
reform project seems bolstered by the lack of a common vision in the
legal scholarship. In addition to the proposal envisioning the creation of
a separate and exclusive subtitle for recycling regulations, 258 commenta256 See Authors Notes of Task Force Meeting (June 23, 1994) (observing that the initial
reactions to the Draft Task Force Report of April 1994 were extremely negative).
257 For basic decision-making theories, see Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, & John
P. Olsen, A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice, 17 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 1-25 (1972)
(describing the "garbage can" model of organizational choice, which (1) emerges from "organized anarchies:" (2) explains decision-making as four independent "streams" of activitiesproblems, solutions, participants, and choice opportunities-that converge unpredictably; and
(3) views the final decision, if any, as the result of whichever combination of solutions and
problems happen to be pulled out of the mix in the "garbage can"); Paul J. Culhane, NEPA's
Impacts on Federal Agencies, Anticipated and Unanticipated, 2() ENVTL. L. 68 I, 682-83 (explaining that under the rational-comprehensive model, decision makers agree on their objectives or preference function, identify all plausible alternate decisions, examine all costs,
benefits, and other consequences of each alternative, and choose the optimum alternative).
258 See Williams & Cannon, supra note 44, at 10,074 (arguing (1) for a discrete subtitle
focused on "the recycling facility itself: the recycling process used, and the air, water, and
waste emissions generated by the process:" (2) that the program "would have to distinguish
appropriately among a broad range of recycling processes and secondary materials, both hazardous and non-hazardous:" and (3) that two simpler permit systems, "one for mere operations
and another, site-specific, for more complex processes," would have to be established). But
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tors have analyzed a wide range of philosophical and substantive fixes.
Some have advanced the idea of placing greater reliance on other environmental laws.2 59 Other scholars have proposed reorienting the current

system through the introduction of market mechanisms 26t and risk-based
considerations. 261 Still others have specifically advocated standardizing
the requirements for recycling and prior ancillary storage or other pertinent management through a streamlined permitting regime 262 or full
2 63

exclusion.
While the scholarly proposals for revision vary in form, substance,
and detail, in the final analysis, "environmental protection, natural resource conservation, and economic competitiveness hang ...

in the bal-

resolved.264

ance" until the waste-product dichotomy is
Some observers
have identified the panoply of jurisdictional, managerial, and residual
loopholes as the culprit.265 Others have criticized the lack of an objec6
tive test for distinguishing recycling from treatment. 26
see Needleman, stqra note 1, at 1028-31 (arguing that "a separate subtitle would be impractical, redundant, and most importantly, would fail to address the root causes of the problems
with RCRA," and asserting that a better approach is to "target specific problems with RCRA
and design specific solutions in the context of the regulatory framework already in existence").
259 See Gaba, supra note 33, at 664 (suggesting reliance on the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. V
1993); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C.
§§ I 10011-11050 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 260112692 (1994)).
260 See id. at 623 (finding that (1) any reform should improve RCRA's performance in
controlling economic extemalities: (2) products do have economic value, while wastes do not;
(3) wastes, which are not produced in response to market demands, gain value as commodities
only through the imposition on society of externalities that RCRA intends to prevent; and (4) if
the regulatory net were tightened, the costs that would otherwise be passed on to society remain with the regulated party).
261 See Sweeney, supra note 6, at 55-74 (proposing: (1) unconditional exemption of commodity-like, risk-free secondary materials from RCRA jurisdiction; (2) conditional exemption
for low-to-medium-risk secondary materials that are handled in an environmentally sound
manner: (3) RCRA Subtitle C regulations for recyclable materials that present a substantial
risk of harm to human health and the environment prior to, during, or after recycling operations; and (4) RCRA Subtitle D control as a residual category for nonhazardous materials not
destined for reuse or recycling or materials no longer possessing reclaimable secondary values): Williams & Cannon, supra note 44, at 10,067 (proposing criteria that would be easier to
understand and facilitate proper compliance and effective enforcement).
262 See Malloy, supra note 8, at 19-50 (arguing that RCRA provides EPA with the requisite jurisdictional basis for imposing permitting requirements, and that permitting "which exhibits features of rulemaking, implementation, and enforcement" allows for tailoring of
generic RCRA management standards to site-specific conditions).
263 See Comella, supra note 3, at 450-51 (arguing that the requirement of a hazardous
waste storage permit partially negates the gains associated with a permit-free recycling process, and that the lack of on-site storage may force a facility either to transfer hazardous waste
directly from the truck to the recycling process or to abandon recycling plans).
264 Sweeney, supra note 6, at 15.
265 See Needleman, supra note 1, at 973, 1018-25 (arguing that "jurisdictional, managerial, and residual . . . loopholes form the basis for the waste/product dichotomy").
266 Comella, supra note 3, at 416.
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But fashioning a workable system able to distinguish between legitimate manufacturing and disguised discard does not have to start from
zero. The TAR test proposed by the Task Force, 26 7 the reuse-efficiency
recycling formula suggested in the literature,2 68 and the six recyclinglegitimacy questions outlined by the Office of Solid Waste 269 provide
valuable discussion points for tackling the waste-product dichotomy.
EPA's current effort to articulate a vision for the RCRA program into the
next 20 years27T1 sends a sounding signal that the Agency will not defer to
the silence of the regulatory status quo in the hazardous waste recycling
arena.

267 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 13, at 5-9 to 5-12.

268 See Comella, supra note 3, at 447-450.
269 See Memorandum from Sylvia K. Lowrance, Director, Office of Solid Waste, EPA to
Hazardous Waste Management Division Directors: Regions I-X, EPA (Apr. 26, 1989) (on file
with author) (inquiring (1)Is the secondary material similar to an analogous raw material or
product?; (2) What degree of processing is required to produce a finished product?; (3) What is
the value of the secondary material?; (4) Is there a guaranteed market for the end product?; (5)
Is the secondary material handled in a manner consistent with the raw material or product it
replaces?; and (6) Are there any other relevant factors?).
270 See EPA, BEYOND RCRA: PROSPECTS FOR WASTE AND MATERIALS MANAGEMENT IN
THE YEAR 2020, DRAFT WHITE PAPER (2000): see also Induso1, Gives New EPA RCRA "Vision" Paper Mixed Reviews, INSIDE EPA's SUPERFUND REPORT, Dec. 25, 2000 at 17 (reporting

that EPA's vision document, inter alia, proposes to: (1)look at waste in the context of a
product's lifecycle: (2) expand the current focus on "waste management" to a broader "materials management" approach: (3) meld RCRA with TSCA; and (4) increase EPA's authority
over hazardous materials before they become wastes).

